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FEDERAL MEDIATION AND CONCILIATION
SERVICE, ADMINISTRATOR
-X

IN THE MATTER OF THE ARBITRATION
between
OPINION AND AWARD
LOCAL 62, AMERICAN FEDERATION OF
GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES AFL-CIO

Case #03-14082

Union,

-andDEFENSE SUPPLY CENTER, PHILADELPHIA
Employer.

-X

The

issue

in

dispute

involves the

propriety

of

the

Job

Opportunity Announcement, and its implementation for the position
Community Technical Specialist, GS-301-12.
A

hearing

Philadelphia,

was

held

Pennsylvania,

at

its

on April

Employer's
28,

2004,

facility

in

at which time

representatives of the Union and the Employer appeared and were
afforded full opportunity, to offer evidence and argument and to
examine and cross-examine witnesses.
waived.

The Arbitrator's Oath was

Summation briefs were filed by both sides.

The Union contends that the process used by the Employer to
fill 14 vacancies in the stated job classification from the 68
applicants
violative

declared
of

eligible

Article

13,

and

referred

for

interviews

other

sections

of

the

bargaining agreement and other regulations and rules.
fatally flawed.

was

collective
And hence

Specifically, the Union asserts that:
1.

The Employer accepted additional qualifying
information
after
the
Job
Opportunity
Announcement was closed.

2.

The Employer improperly re-rated and
ranked the referred qualified candidates.

3.

The Employer disregarded established past
practice by using direct supervisory input in
the selection process.

4.

The Employer made decisions regarding credit
for education outside of the Job Opportunity
Application.

5.

The Selection Panel's responsibilities
duties were illegally intertwined with
selecting officials.

6.

The
selection
violated
breaking procedures.

established

7.

The criteria
evaluated.

was

8.

The Employer committed a violation when it
made
additional
selections
despite
the
Union's grievance in this case.

9.

The Employer discriminated against protected
under-represented minorities.

of

"merit"

not

re-

and
the

tie-

properly

After full study of all the rules and regulations relied on
by the Union, I find that what is relevant and controlling
Article

13

agreement.

(Merit

Promotion)

of

the

collective

And that the Union's allegations,

is

bargaining

to be sustained,

must show a violation or violations of that Article, inasmuch as
that is what the parties bi-laterally negotiated as the process

and

procedure

for

filing

promotional

opportunities

in

the

bargaining unit.
Pertinent

to

these

cases

are

the

following

Sections of

Article 13:
SECTION 1 - PURPOSE AND SCOPE
This Article is applicable to all promotions
to Agency positions within the bargaining units
represented by the DLA Council.
The Agency has the right to select or not to
select from among a group of highly qualified
promotion candidates, including the right to nonselect all candidates.
SECTION 5C
3.
Cooperate in the resolution of questions
concerning their qualifications and eligibility for
a specific job vacancy or job category by providing
pertinent information as may be requested or
required.
SECTION 9
B.
Candidates must be evaluated
on the
basis of their knowledge, skills, and abilities
(KSA) relevant to the position being filled.
For
each position (or group of positions) which will be
filled through competitive promotion procedures, a
written rating plan must be developed. This plan
will describe:
1.
The knowledge, skills, and abilities
identified through job analysis as necessary for
successful job performance and the degree to which
each is needed.
2.

The measurement methods to be used.

3.
How the highly
determined.

qualified group will be

E.
All rating plans must evaluate promotion
candidates on the basis of experience, education,
training
and
self-development,
awards
and
performance ratings.
F.
Evaluation procedures to be followed and
measuring information to be used will be based
solely on job related criteria.
Unless otherwise
negotiated locally, all ranking plans will use a
maximum point score of 100.
As a minimum, the
factors which must be considered in the development
of ranking plans are:
(a) Quality of Experience,
(b) Performance Rating, (c) Education, Training,
and Self-Development, and (d) Awards.
Additional
factors considered relevant and essential to the
ranking process such as required test or group
interviews,
etc., may
be
used.
Promotion
candidates with no performance rating, no relevant
critical elements, or whose rating does not match
the DLA scoring process, will be given a score
equal to "Fully Acceptable."
H.
Only
education, training,
and selfdevelopment completed by the closing date of the
JOA may be credited if it is indicative of likely
possession of one or more of the knowledge, skills,
or abilities of the vacancy.
I.
Each candidate's score for the rating
elements will be determined by a review of the
Supplemental Qualifications Statement (SQS) and/or
the SF-171 or locally developed substitute form
submitted.
OPFs will be used only to corroborate
information provided by the candidate.
SECTION 10 - USE OF PANELS IN THE PROMOTION PROCESS

A.
Rating and ranking panels may be used to
evaluate
and
rank
candidates
for
promotion
consideration.
If management elects to convene a
rating and ranking panel, it will notify the Union
and will ensure that Union nominees are fully
considered in its selection of panel members.
B.
Panels
used to rank candidates
for
positions at GS-12 and above must include a subject
matter expert.

C.
Panel
members
will
be
provided
sufficient guidance concerning the methods and
procedures for evaluation and ranking candidates so
as to enable them to thoroughly understand and
uniformly apply the evaluation process.
D.
Panels will not function in any way
which preempts the selecting official's authority.
SECTION 11 - REFERRAL OF CANDIDATES FOR SELECTION
A.
A
list
of
the
highly
qualified
candidates, as determined by the Civilian Personnel
Office or a rating panel, as applicable, will be
referred
to
the
selecting
official
for
consideration.
The number to be referred will be
determined locally.
SECTION 12 - CANDIDATE INTERVIEWS
A.
Generally,
all
candidates
will
be
interviewed.
Candidates who are not readily
available need not be interviewed or may be
interviewed by phone.
To expedite
staffing,
additional candidates who need not be interviewed
may be determined locally based on whether the
position(s),
interviewer(s),
and
the
organization (s) are similar and how much time has
elapsed since the last interview.
With regard to Section 9H. above it is agreed that after
the closing date of the JOA, no new or additional information may
be submitted by the applicant.
I

choose

through 9.

to

deal

first

with

the

Union's

objections

2

Each is determinable by one or more of the foregoing

Sections of Article 13.
Objection #1 states that the process of reducing the number
of

applicants for further consideration by judging eleven of the

68 as only "good" or "average," from the threshold listing as
"highly

qualified"

is

a violation.

5

The Union appears to confuse the initial "highly qualified"
rating of all 68 candidates with the second step of the selection
process, namely the evaluation of each for legitimate reduction
to 14, as there were only 14 vacancies to fill.
resulted

from

credentials

the

and

Employer's

an

evaluation

interview.

This

of

The second step
each

narrowing

candidates
process

is

precisely authorized by Sections ID, 9B, E, F above.
Objection

#3,

namely

the

Employer's

use

of

supervisory

input in the evaluation process, is contradicted by the universal
right of management to seek and consider a supervisor's view of a
candidate for promotion, with the exception that such input may
not be arbitrary, capricious or discriminatory.

Here there is no

evidentiary showing of any such motives to supervisory input.
"Vagueness" of the input is not a disqualifying

factor, provided

it is not used as a critical or determinative element.

And that

has not been shown in this case.
Objection

#4

represents

the

Union's

view

of

how

the

educational factors and experience were utilized and credited.

I

agree with the Union that a "trade school" certificate is not
equivalent

to a BS/BA

college

degree.

But

the question is

whether for this particular job, that trade-school course, with
the skills, experience and aptitude required of that job, may be
equivalent or even superior to a Bachelor's degree.
judgment

call,

determining

and

an

exercise

qualifications

of

managerial

for particular job.
6

That is a

authority

Put another

in

way,

the

burden

is

on

the

Union

to

show

that

the

Panel's

recommendations regarding education and experience were unrelated
to

the

job

requirements,

and

that

any

such

evaluation

was

irregularly made for the purpose of favoritism or discrimination.
That burden has not been met here.

Additionally, management's

rights in this regard, again absent proof of arbitrariness, is
sanctioned

by

Section

ID

above

and

in

accordance

with

the

Employer's authority to develop and apply a "plan" applicable to
the job in question.

Finally, the Employer's decisions, as part

of its "plan" to accord extra weight to certain factors is again,
job related presumptively.

Only if found to be arbitrary or

improperly preferential, may it be successfully challenged.

The

arbitrator cannot determine if "experience with threaded or nonthreaded products" is relevant.

I cannot say it is irrelevant.

Objection #5 has not been proved to my satisfaction.
Employer

has

established
evidence

the

express

right

under

Section

10

above

a Panel to assist in the selection process.

shows

that

the

Panel

obtained

information

The
to
The

and made

evaluations which it reported to the selecting officer.

I find

nothing in the evidence that the Panel or its members usurped the
selecting
Indeed,

officer's authority
the

authorized
information

probative

by

Section

and making

to make the ultimate

evidence
10,

acted

judgments

shows

that

the

substantively

in

on qualifications

decisions.
Panel,

as

acquiring
among

candidates, but that they acted under the guidance of the
7

the

selecting
delegated

officer,

and

in

an

advisory,

albeit

role, as is contemplated by Section

important,

10.

In short,

there is no evidence of a "conflict of interest" between the role
of the Panel and the selecting officer.
Objections #6 and #7 involve the contention

that weighted

credit for certain factors and the use of factors only for "tiebreaking" purposes, are violations.

Again, both methods are part

of the Employer's plan, which unless shown to be unrelated to the
job duties in question or otherwise arbitrary, must be credited
as a proper
contract
education,

managerial

does

not

function

specify

training,

how

under
the

self-development,

ratings are to be to judged.

Section

9 above.

The

factors

of

experience,

awards

and

performance

"Due consideration" of each and all

allows for different credit and emphasis, based on the Employer's
determinations of the skills, and experience needed.

So/ again,

unless 'arbitrariness is shown, the Arbitrator cannot substitute
his

judgment

for

that

of

the

Employer

qualitative requirements of a particular job.

in

assessing

the

Extra weight for

some more relevant factors is permissible and to use "awards" and
"education" as "tie-breakers"
weight" requirements.

meets "due consideration"

or "due

In short, "due weight" is subjective, with

the presumption in favor of a legitimate exercise of a management
right.

Objection #8 is procedurally erroneous.

Merely because the

Union has grieved the process in this case does not mean that the
Employer

must

stop

processing

appointments

thereunder.

The

Employer may do so, at the risk that their appointments may be
vacated or otherwise changed if the process is ultimately deemed
flawed.

Any other rule, unless specified in the contract (which

it is not) would enjoin the Employer from carrying out its duties
and

responsibilities.

Employer's

authority.

A

grievance

It

only puts

does
the

not

suspend

legitimacy

the

of that

authority in question for arbitral or legal determination.

Like

any alleged violation of civil law, the right of the parties
involved
legally

to

continue

enjoined.

the disputed practice

There is no

continues, unless

such contractual

or arbitral

injunction in this case.
With
assertion.
under

regard

to objection

#9, the Union's

It has not shown probatively

represented

ontends otherwise.

in

this

job

claim

is mere

that minorities are

classification.

The Employer

At best the evidence is unclear.

And with

the burden on the Union to prove that allegation, the absence of
lear and convincing evidence negates the allegation.
What remains is Objection #1.

Here I am troubled by what

the Employer did and I find merit in the Union's assertion that
Article 13 Section 9H was violated by adding new or additional

substantive

information

to

the

applications

of

some

of

the

applicants after the JOA was closed.
The
exercised

Employer
its

denies

right

to

that

it

"clarify"

did
or

so,
"get

information on the submitted application.
irregular

and potentially prejudicial

but

rather

only

explanations"

of

But I still deem it

to other applicants who

relied only on the information submitted.

For it cannot be said

that the additional information provided did not have an effect
on the subsequent evaluations of the Panel or the rankings the
Panel recommended, to the disadvantage of those eleven applicants
who were not promoted. This is so notwithstanding the fact that
all 68 applicants were initially found qualified.
Article 9H, means, and as mutually

stipulated,

that each

applicant stands or falls on the credentials he submits with his
application.
That the applicant may not add new information; does not
mean, as the Employer

erroneously

argues,

that

a Panel or a

selecting officer may obtain that additional information.

That

would be an obvious circumvention of the restrictions of Section
9H and a violation, albeit indirectly, nonetheless.

In short, to

do something by indirection that cannot be done directly is a
well-settled legal prohibition.
What

the

Employer

did

here

went

beyond

seeking

bare

clarifications and/or explanations, but prompted some applicants

10

to add,

expand

or supplement

the credentials

they originally

supplied.
Specifically, I accept as accurate the Union's claim (and
as the testimony reveals) that:
(a)

Employee Gene Boss was told to supply an
official transcript.

(b)

Employee Anthony M. Carenia was told to
submit a transcript or grade card for a
course in "Human Resources" at Penn
State, to raise his academic credits
from 22 (on the original application) to
25.

(c)

Employee James F. Heimen, Jr. was told to
submit certain transcripts and "original
application and questionnaire."1

I cannot tell from the record how severe or prejudicial
this violation may have been.

It may have been of de minimus

effect, with no change in the ranking of those who succeeded, or
alternatively prejudicial

to other candidates.

Therefore the

Union's request for a remedy for violation(s), namely that the
eleven unsuccessful candidate be promoted to the job in question,
is inappropriate and excessive.
What is appropriate, in my view, and the customary remedy
in cases where a process has been flawed, is to order a re-play
of the process, eliminating therefrom the points of violation.

I

shall direct that that be done, and I expect it will be done by
the Employer in good faith, with a de novo result that may or may
The nature of the "application and questionnaire" is unclear. But it is additional information, not submitted
originally, and beyond a clarification or explanation.
1

11

not change the order and rankings of those applicants selected
and those rejected.
The

Undersigned,

duly

designated

as the Arbitrator,

and

having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above-named
parties, makes the following AWARD:
All the Union's objection to the process and
methods of promoting applicants to the job
classification
of
Community
Technical
Specialist GS-301-12 under a Job Opportunity
Announcement are rejected, except for one
objection.
The Union's claim of violation of Article 13
Section 9H is upheld.
Because the evidence
does not show how prejudicial that violation
was, the Union's request for a remedy, namely
the promotion of eleven applicants who were
rejected, is denied.
The appropriate remedy is for the selection
to
be
redone
ab
initio,
omitting
the
information that violated Section 9H.
I direct that the repeating of the process
without the offending factor be done in good
faith, so that the ultimate ranking of the
candidates reflect a flawless procedure.
Pending that renewed process, the present
status quo, with the promotions made, shall
be maintained.

Eric J. Schmertz, Arbitrator
DATED:

November 5, 2004

STATE OF NEW YORK

)
ss:

:OUNTY OF NEW YORK

)

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who executed
this instrument, which is my
AWARD.
U

THE NEW YORK PLAN FOR THE SETTLEMENT
OF JURISDICTIONS DISPUTE
-X
IN THE MATTER OF THE ARBITRATION
between
OPERATING ENGINEERS LOCAL 14-14B
OPINION AND AWARD

-andINTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF ELECTRICAL
WORKERS, LOCAL 3
-X

The jurisdictional dispute between the above-named

Unions

involves the question of which union has jurisdiction over the
operation

of

two

overhead,

Type

B

cranes

at

the

Pcletti

Powerhouse, in Astoria Queens, New York.
A hearing was held before an Arbitration Panel on May 5,
2004, at which time representatives of both unions appeared and
were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and
to examine and cross-examine witnesses.
The operation of the two cranes is presently split between
the two unions - one is operated by the Operating Engineers, the
other by the I.B.E.W.

Both cranes are performing identical work.

The

was

"50-50"

sharing

on

order

of

the

contractor,

and

apparently pursuant to a decision of the Executive Council of
the American Federation of Labor, dated August 4, 1926.
Local
arrangement,

3,

I.B.E.W.

is

satisfied

with

the

split

work

arguing that i't: isln accord with that decision and

seeks

affirmation

of

that

arrangement

from

this

Arbitration

Panel.
Local 14-14B of the Operating Engineers claims jurisdiction
over both cranes, asserting that the 1926 decision is
inapplicable.

Rather, it argues that by consistent practice
!

in

the

Greater

New

York

geographical • area,

such

cranes

have

always been operated by members of the Operating Engineers, and
that that prevailing practice is determinative.
As the parties were expressly advised at the outset of the
hearing, the authority of the Arbitration
York

Plan

for

the

Settlement

Panel under the New

Jurisdictional

Disputes,

is as

follows, inter alia and in pertinent part:
"The arbitration panel shall be bound by Green Book
decisions...or where there are none, International
Agreements of record between the trades.
of

these

apply

for any

reason...the

If none

arbitration

panel shall consider the established trade practice
and prevailing practice in the Greater New

York

geographical area."
The parties agreed that there are no applicable Green Book
decisions.

The Panel finds that the cited decision of 1926

is not.an International Agreement, within the
meaning

of

the Panel's

authority.

An

International Agreement

must

be

signed

involved.

by

the

presidents

of

the

respective

unions

Standing alone, as a "decision" it was obviously not a

negotiated Agreement between the parties, nor signed by their
presidents.

Moreover, and significantly, the 1926 decision, by

its express

terms was

confined

to and applicable

western states, not including New York.

to thirteen

Additionally, the cited

Memorandum of Understanding of July 21, 1965, which affirms the
1926

decision

fails

the

test

of

an

applicable

International

Agreement on two grounds.

First, though it incorporates and

affirms the

it makes no change

1926 decision,

in the limits

thereof, namely limiting it still to the thirteen western states
of

Colorado,

Idaho,

Montana,

Utah,

Wyoming,

California, Nevada, Oregon and Washington.
not included or covered.

Alaska,

Hawaii,

Again, New York is

Secondly, that Memorandum was signed

(or purported to have been signed) by the I.B.E.W. Vice Presidents
of the eighth and ninth

Districts and the Regional Director,

tenth Region of the Operating Engineers.

It was not signed by

the respective presidents of the unions, and hence does not rise
to the level of an International Agreement.
Accordingly as Local 3 I.B.E.W. relies entirely on the 1926
decision, it has failed to meet its burden of proof in this case.
Conversely,

Local

14-14B

of

the

Operating

Engineers,

relying on established and prevailing trade practice, has met its

burden of proof.
over

the

years,

By evidence and testimony it has shown that
with

Poletti power plant,

the

only

overhead

exception

being

the

instant

cranes of this type have been

operated by members of the Operating Engineers Union.

Indeed,

Local 3 I.B.E.W. concedes that its claim for jurisdiction in this
case is because there are two cranes at work, and that it seeks
the right to operate one of them, not both.

It acknowledges

that if there was a single crane, it would concede jurisdiction
to the Operating Engineers, and would not have joined in this
arbitration.

With our rejection of the 1926 decision, the Panel

views that concession and acknowledgement as

determinative

of the

Operating Engineer's jurisdiction over both cranes.
The prevailing trade practice, which is
this

case,

has

been

Operating Engineers.

shown

clearly

and

controlling

convincingly

in
by

the

Eleven affidavits and supporting testimony

were submitted into evidence showing the unvaried trade practice
in the New York

geographical

area of assignment

cranes of this type to the Operating Engineers.
is devoid

of any examples

of operating

And the record

(except the one in dispute) of an

assignment to Local 3 I.B.E.W.

For the foregoing reasons, the Panel makes the

following

AWARD:
The operation of the two Type B overhead cranes at
the P-bletti Powerhouse, in Astoria Queens, New York
is

work

that

belongs

to

Local

14-14B

of

the

International Union of Operating Engineers.

Eric J. Schmertz, Chairman

DATED:

May 11, 2004

STATE OF NEW YORK

)

COUNTY OF NEW YORK

)

ss:

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Chairman that I am the individual described in and who executed
this instrument, which is my AWARD.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION,
ADMINISTRATOR
IN THE MATTER OF THE ARBITRATION
between
IUE-CWA, LOCAL 201
-andGENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY

OPINION AND AWARD
Case#llE3000247603

The stipulated issue is:
Whether the termination of BERNEST WATFORD was for just cause and if not, what
shall the remedy be.
A hearing was held on March 10, 2004 at the offices of the American Arbitration
Association in Boston, Massachusetts, at which time Mr. Watford, hereinafter referred to as the
"grievant" and representatives of the above-named Union and Company appeared. All concerned
were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to examine and cross-examine
witnesses. The Arbitrator's Oath was waived, a stenographic record of the hearing taken, and both
sides filed post-hearing briefs.
It is clear that the grievant engaged in vouchering irregularities by deferring to a later date
some of his production made on a prior day. As a result, on the subsequent day the added
production from an earlier day produced a "vouchered" record for the subsequent day that
exceeded the actual quantity of work done that day. Conversely, his 'Vouchering" of work done on
the earlier day was less than actually produced, leaving the excess for vouchering later.
The record is unclear why the grievant did so, except for his explanation that he held
reporting production from an earlier day until a later day "to even out bad production days with
good production days," thereby consistently meeting expected production standards.
The Company suggests that he did so to permit loafing or other non-productive activity on
the subsequent day, on his shift to which no supervisor was assigned. But there is no probative
evidence supporting the Company's suspicious. Rather, the record shows that the productivity
flow (where work on a particular part is sequential, requiring the completion of certain steps before
the part can be moved for further work) was not impeded or delayed by the grievant' s later
vouchering because the parts so "under claimed" on a given day, were nonetheless worked on in
the prescribed sequence and moved on schedule to the next step of productivity.
It is also a fact that the grievant did not profit monetarily by what he did. He is paid on an
hourly basis, not on a piece work basis. Moreover, as the work was in fact done, albeit vouchered
or accounted for at some subsequent point, what the grievant did, although irregular and probably
skewed the Company's vouchering system, did not involve a fraudulent claim for work not done or
for payment for work not done. Also his total productivity did not fall below standard.
The Company claims that the grievant' s methodology (which occurred some 71 times)
distorted the unit cost calculations which it uses to structure bills for its customers. But, based on
the record, I am not satisfied that the Company has proved that assertion (upon which it relied at
least in part, in imposing the discharge penalty) by the clear and convincing standard required in
discharge cases. Importantly, the Company did not show that customers were wrongly or
inaccurately billed as a consequence. So I see no negative economic or even public relations
detriment to the Company's dealings with its customers.

In defending its discharge penalty, the Company relies on its Code of Conduct (which it
unilaterally promulgated). In doing so, it is so bound and constrained. It charges that the
grievant's conduct falls within the terminal step of the Vouchering disciplinary sequence. That
step calls for the penalty of discharge for:
"Vouchering irregularities of a more serious nature such as a claim
for payment or claim for work not performed."
In short, discharge is the penalty for fraud or theft where an employee seeks payment or a
credit for work not and never performed. And that, in my view is what is meant by "a more serious
nature." Here, within the context and content of vouchering misconduct, the justification of the
penalty of discharge is so delineated and defined. Therefore, unless a false claim for payment or
;redit can be shown, the penalty of discharge is not appropriate, other potential consequences,
especially if unproved, not withstanding.
But, clearly, the grievant is not blameless. He had no right to "level out" his production by
the method he employed. It violated the vouchering instructions given him Indeed he knew he
was doing something wrong, by admitting his practice during the Company's investigation, and by
promising "it would not happen again." His offense is clearly recognized and defined under the
"suspension" penalty section of vouchering. The Code of Conduct provides for a disciplinary
suspension for:
"Vouchering irregularities that involve such things as overstatements
or understatements with respect to the recording of time on a
particular voucher,"
The foregoing is precisely what the grievant did. He underestimated his actual production
on day one and overstated it on day two. And by nonetheless arranging for the deferred part(s) to
flow to the next production point, even though not yet vouchered, his vouchering reports were
erroneous "with respect to the recording of time...."
The Company argues that because the foregoing statement refers in the singular to "a
particular voucher" (emphasis added) it applies only to a single violation and not to the multiple
(71) acts of the grievant. I do not read it that way. I conclude that that language only identifies the
offense, but is not a limitation on the number of times the offense may occur for that Code Section
to apply. I doubt that this particular provision of the Code of Conduct was legislated for a single
offense. That the grievant acted some 71 times in violation has a bearing on the measure of the
penalty imposed under that section of the Code. Here, because of the grievant's multiple
violations, I shall impose a disciplinary, penalty of the entire period he has been out. But it is still
that section of the Code that is applicable.
Accordingly, the appropriate penalty compelled by the Company's own Code of Conduct is
a suspension, not discharge. And as stated, a suspension from the date of his discharge to his
reinstatement, as ordered below, is appropriate.

The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator, and having duly heard the proofs and
allegations of the above-named parties, makes the following AWARD:
There was not just cause of the discharge of BERNEST WATFORD.
There was just cause for a suspension. He shall be reinstated but
without back pay.
The period of time between his discharge and his reinstatement shall
be deemed a proper disciplinary penalty.
Eric J. Schmertz, Arbitrator
DATED: May 13, 2004
STATE OF NEW YORK

)

ss:
COUNTY OF NEW YORK )
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as Arbitrator that I am the individual described
in and who executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

-X
IN THE MATTER OF THE ARBITRATION
between
OPINION AND AWARD
LOCAL UNION NO. 322, B.U.W. COUNCIL
-andMASSACHUSETTS ELECTRIC COMPANY
-X

The stipulated issue is:
Did
the Company
violate the collective
bargaining agreement by not assigning an
overhead line crew from the Spencer Platform
to perform work in New York for the Niagra
Mohawk Company on Friday, April 4, 2003?
If
not, what shall be the remedy, if any?
A

hearing

was

held

in

Worcester,

Massachusetts

on

November 17, 2003 at which time representatives of the above-named
Union and Company appeared.
arbitration

was

waived

and

The contractual tri-partite board of
the

Undersigned as sole arbitrator.

parties

proceeded

before

the

The Arbitrator's Oath was waived.

All concerned were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and
argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.
The Company filed a post-hearing brief.
right to do so.

The Union waived its

The Union relies on Article III, Section 3 of the collective
agreement.

It reads:
Section 3.
Mutually agreed upon working
conditions
now existing, established past
practices, or any working conditions will not
be changed during the term of this contract.
In order for the Company or the Union to show
that a claimed past practice is binding, it
must establish the following:
a.

The past practice has been
consistently followed by the
parties for a reasonable time
period, and

b.

The past practice is a result of a
formal or informal agreement
between the Union and the Company
over any working condition.

The Union asserts that it has been a "past practice" within
the definition and requirements of Article III Section 3, for the
Company to assign a crew from the Spencer Platform (located east
of

Worcester,

requires

Massachusetts)

and requests

whenever

assistance

another

in handling

utility
outages

company
or other

power emergencies.
In the instant case, the Niagra Mohawk Company in New York
State encountered such problems and requested crew assistance from
Massachusetts Electric.

In response the Company sent crews from

the Worcester and Leominster platform on April 4th, 2003; and a

crew from Spencer, not until the next day, April 5th.

The Union

contends that a crew from Spencer should have been sent on April
4th, also.
The Company denies the applicability of Article III, Section
3 on two grounds.
and conditioned

First it argues that that Section is modified

by that part of Article

III, Section

1 which

reads:
"The Union and the Local recognize the right
and power of the Company to...to assign...or
direct all working forces...and generally to
control
and
supervise
the
Company's
operations
and
to
exercise
the
other
customary function of Management....
If the Local claims that the Company has
exercised any of the foregoing rights in a
capricious or arbitrary manner, such claim
shall be subject to the Grievance Procedure
in Article XVI.." (emphasis added),
and that there has been no "past practice
(that) has been consistently followed by the
parties for a reasonable time period" nor is
any past practice "the result of a formal or
informal agreement..."
I need not resolve the interplay between Sections 1 and 3 of
Article

III because at the threshold the Union

has

failed to

establish the existence of a "past practice" within the meaning
and conditions of Section 3.

Company Exhibit #1, which stands unrefuted by the Union shows
that for the period January 1998 to April 2003, (and excluding the
instant circumstance), the out-of-town
not

consistently

include

a

crew

assignments of crews did

from

Specifically, on July 2, 2002 and August
crew

from

Leominster

Spencer

Platform.

3, 2001 at

(Merrimock

Valley) ,

a

Spencer.

Similarly, on August 10, 2001 (North Shore) only a crew

from Leominster was assigned.

was

the

sent,

but

not

one

from

So, on three occasions out of a

total of eight assignments from the Central District between 1998
and March 2003, Spencer crews were not deployed to the out-of-town
locations.
Also, unrefuted is the Company's testimony that as a policy
it

has

apportioned

out-of-town

overtime

separately

as well as

conjunctively among the three platforms at Worcester, Leominster
and Spencer and that Spencer has received the fewest because of
its size, relative to the other two.

There is no testimony that

there was a "formal or informal agreement" to the contrary.
So, I do not find the establishment of a "past practice" that
has been "consistently followed...for a reasonable period of time"
or "a formal or informal agreement" supporting any such practice.

Hence, I do not find an evidentiary basis in this case to
hold Section 3 pre-eminent over the general managerial rights set
forth in Section 1 of Article III.
Accordingly, the grievance is denied.
The Undersigned,

duly designated

as the Arbitrator

in

the above matter, and having duly heard the proofs and allegations
of the above-named parties, makes the following AWARD:
The Company did not violate the collective
bargaining agreement by not assigning an
overhead line crew from the Spencer Platform
to work at Niagra Mohawk Company on Friday,
April 4, 2003.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED:

March 11, 2004

STATE OF NEW YORK
ss:
COUNTY OF NEW YORK

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who executed
this instrument, which is my AWARD.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION,
ADMINISTRATOR

-X
IN THE MATTER OF THE ARBITRATION
between
OPINION AND AWARD
LOCAL 30 I.U.O.E., AFL-CIO
Case #133000190403

-andMERIDIAN MANAGEMENT CORP.

-X

The Undersigned was selected as the Arbitrator to decide a
dispute between the above-named Union and Employer involving the
job classifications of HENRY MALDONADO and DARRYL JOHNSON.
A hearing was held on December 5, 2003 at which time
Messrs. Maldonado and Johnson, hereinafter referred to as the
"grievants" or individually as "Maldonado" and "Johnson, "
appeared, together with representatives of the Union and
Employer.

All concerned were afforded full opportunity to offer

evidence and argument and to examine and cross-examine
witnesses.
Post-hearing briefs were filed.

The parties could not agree on a stipulated issue, leaving
the determination of the issue to the Arbitrator.

As is usual

in such circumstance, I deem the issue to be:
""What shall be the deposition of the Union' s
grievance on behalf of Maldonado and
Johnson, numbered 2/2003 and dated February
1, 2003, and the Union's Notice of Intention
to arbitrate, dated August 5, 2003.
The grievance reads:
"Violation of Schedule A (of the contract)
Darryl and Henry are working out of title.
They are doing Inspectors work and are being
paid as Clerks.
Settlement Desired. To have titles and rate
adjusted retro to 1 October...."
The Notice of Intention to arbitrate reads:
"The improper working out of title of HENRY
MALDONADO and DARRYL JOHNSON as Quality
Control Inspectors or similar titles without
paying them the appropriate rate of pay for
said work in violation of the Agreement
between the parties at the Fort Hamilton
Army Base, Brooklyn, New York location.
In short, based on the duties they perform, the Union seeks
an upgrading of the grievants from their present titles of
Shipping/Receiving Clerk (Maldonado) and Lead Shipping/
Receiving Clerk (Johnson) to the classification of Quality
Control Inspector or similar titles with retroactive pay
increases.

-2-

In the course of the hearing, the Union asserted
alternatively that the grievants were entitled to the
classification of General Clerks.
Controlling in this case are Schedule A of the contract,
which enumerates the bi-laterally negotiated job
classifications, Article XXI-Management Rights, Section 1 and
Section 4 of Article VII-Grievance Procedure.
Article XXI Section 1 and reads:
ARTICLE XXI - MANAGEMENT RIGHTS
Section 1. The Union agrees that the
management of the Employer and the direction
of the working force shall be in the
discretion of the Employer, and agrees that
all management rights (except as
specifically limited by any of the express
provisions of this Agreement) are reserved
to the Employer, including the right to hire
new Employees to promote, to transfer, to
discipline, suspend or discharge for just
cause, to assign work, to schedule employees
work week and the working hours including
overtime, to classify employees, to
introduce new or improved methods or
facilities, and to require employees to
observe reasonable rules and regulations,
(emphasis added)
Section 4 of Article VII reads:
"The Arbitrator shall have no power to add
to, subtract from or modify in any way any
of the term of this Agreement."
Under the Employer's rights in Article XXI and the
restrictions on the authority of the Arbitrator in Article VII
it is obvious that the Arbitrator does not have the authority to

-3-

reclassify the grievants as Quality Control Inspectors.

That

classification or title is not included in Schedule A of the
contract.

To grant that requested classification would be to

add a pob title to Schedule A and would constitute an addition
to the contract expressly prohibited by Section 4 of Article
VII.

That express restriction is binding on the Arbitrator

regardless of the nature of the duties the grievants are
performing.
As to the Union's alternate argument that the Schedule A
classification of General Office Clerk is proper and appropriate
for the grievants, the Employer asserts that its managerial
right to "classify employees" is restricted only if the exercise
of that right is "limited by any of the express provisions of
(the) Agreement."

And that the Union cannot point to any

express provision violated.
The Union is correct in arguing that the Employer's right
to classify employers may be challenged and changed if the
exercise of the right is an abuse of its managerial authority,
as arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable.
Here,- again irrespective of the nature of the work
performed by the grievants, I do not find their classification
as Shipping/Receiving Clerk or Lead Shipping/Receiving Clerk to
be arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable.

-4-

Even if inaccurate, they were so classified by the Employer
based on a U.S. Department of Labor classification of similarly
employed personnel at another army base (Fort Drum).

Also, when

the grievants were transferred into the Employer's bargaining
unit from their early employment with a sub-contractor, they
carried with them the classifications they then had, namely
Shipping/Receiving Clerk and Lead Shipping/Receiving Clerk.

And

they were slotted into classifications the parties negotiated in
Schedule A.

The Union did not at that time try to or succeed in

negotiating a new classification for them or get them included
in the general office clerk title.

Recognizing the Employer's

managerial right to "classify employees," the Union's argument
that the instant classifications should be overturned as
arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable cannot be sustained.

For

under the foregoing circumstances an inaccuracy between the
classification and the duties performed is not enough to prove
arbitrariness, capriciousness or unreasonableness.
Nor am I able to conclude within my limited authority, that
the instant classifications violated Schedule A, as asserted in
the grievance.

Assuming that the classifications listed in

Schedule A are "express provisions of the Agreement" within the
meaning of the Management Rights clause, the burden is in the
Union to show that the grievants' entitlement to the

-5-

classification of General Office Clerk, is violated by their
classifications as Shipping/Receiving Clerks.
Confined to the issue as defined by the grievance and
Notice of Intent to Arbitrate, the Union must prove that the job
of General Office Clerks is "similar" to Quality Control
Inspector.

It has not done so.

Also, even if a substantive comparison of the work
performed and the classification General Clerk is within the
Arbitrator's authority, the Union has not shown that the
particular and seemingly unique work performed by the grievants
(in administering the movement, storage and inventory of
property belonging to army personnel going from one duty station
ox location to another) fits adequately or persuasively into the
General Office Clerk classification.

My examination of the job

description of General Office Clerk does not satisfy me that it
reflects the type of work the grievants perform.
Indeed, Maldonado testified frankly that the title "that
best fits his job was that of Inspector/Quality Control."

Not

General Office Clerk.
Accordingly, if the grievants are now mis-classified

and if

they are performing work of a higher responsibility and are
entitled to a classifications and wage rate that accurately
reflects their work, it is obviously a matter for collective

bargaining and negotiations between the parties but not within
the authority of the arbitration forum.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator, and
having been duly sworn and having duly heard the proofs and
allegations of the above-named parties, makes the following
AWARD:
The Union's grievance on behalf of HENRY
MALDONADO and DARRYL JOHNSON dated February
7, 2003, is denied.

Eric J. Schmertz, Arbitrator

DATED:

February 5, 2004

STATE OF NEW YORK

)

COUNTY OF NEW YORK

)

ss:

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who executed
this instrument, which is my AWARD.
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RI-399 JURISDICTIONAL DISPUTE
ARBITRATION PANEL
-X

IN THE MATTER OF THE ARBITRATION
OPINION AND AWARD
between
Case #BOOM-1B-503228644
UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE
P&DC Buffalo, N.Y.

-andOperational Change 121-48
AMERICAN POSTAL WORKERS UNION, AFL-CIO
-andNATIONAL POSTAL MAIL HANDLERS UNION

-X

Before:

Eric J. Schmertz, Arbitrator

Appearances:

For the U.S. Postal Services
Mr. Anthony Salzo, Jr.
For the APWU:
Mr. Michael E. LaPoint
For the NPMHU:
Mr. David E. Wilkin

Place of Hearing:

Buffalo P&D Facility

Date of Hearing:

September 8, 2004

The stipulated issues are:
(1)

Did the Postal Service violate the Memorandum
of Understanding of April 16, 1992 under the
Dispute Resolution Procedures?

(2)

Did the Postal Service violate RI 399 by
assigning clerks to manual operation 121-48.
If so, what shall be the remedy, except
monetary?

A hearing was held in Buffalo, New York on September 8, 2004,
at which time representatives of the above-named parties appeared
and were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument
and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.

Post hearing briefs

were filed which reached the Arbitrator on October 19, 2004.
At the threshold, I conclude that the establishment of the
manual

operation

121-48,

staffed

solely

by

clerks,

was

an

operational change within the meaning of that part of the Dispute
Resolution Procedures which requires that the Service "present and
discuss such change(s) with the Local Dispute Resolution Committee
thirty

(30) days prior to the effective date of the operational

change."
The change was from or in addition to a machine

function

staffed by both mail handlers and clerks performing dedicated work
assignments,
clerks.

to a "bull

pen" manual

operation

staffed only by

Clearly, it was a methodological change that resulted in

changing a mixed jurisdiction of clerks and mail handlers, to one
of

exclusivity

for

clerks.

And

that,

in

my

view,

is

a

"reassignment of function from one craft to another" (i.e. from a
mixed assignment of two crafts to one craft).

This

procedural

requirement

is

a

contractual

precedent to establishing the changed operation.

condition

The parties are

bound to it, and the Arbitrator must enforce it.
Here, though it would appear that the Service constructively
or substantially complied with that requirement, I conclude that
it did not comply with its essential spirit and intent.

Indeed,

it is well-settled law that an act may be within the letter of the
law but not within its spirit and intent.

And if not compliant

with its spirit and intent, it is avoidable.
The

Service's

purported

thirty-day notice to the affected

Union took the form of a letter dated January 14, 2004 to the Mail
Handlers,

advising

effective

February

that

"a

permanent

change"

would

be

16, 2000" and that there would be

made

a trial

period or experimental period from January 16, 2004 to February
16, 2004.

It went on to invite the Mail Handlers to contact the

Service if it had any "input" regarding the change.
period or experimental period was implemented,

The trial

and staffed with

clerks.
I find that the purpose and intent of the thirty-day notice
was not

satisfied

by that letter, and that the rights of the

affected Union (the Mail Handlers) were prejudiced by the trial or
experimental period put in place by the Service within the 30-day
period - indeed within two days following the date of the letter.

As

in

FibreBoard1

and

the

recent

notice

requirements

for

plant closings in the private sector, the thirty-day notice, in my
view, was intended not just to give a Union notice of a change
that affected its jurisdiction, but of equal importance to afford
the affected Union the chance to discuss the proposed or projected
change with the Service in an effort to resolve disputes over the
change; to attempt to modify the change or its impact; to make
concessions that might obviate or lessen the change and to fully
explore

and

understand

the

business

and

operational

needs

underlying the change.
These opportunities, as contemplated by the thirty-day notice
provisions, were not realistically
this case.

afforded the Mail Handlers in

By implementing the change on a trial or experimental

basis, the Mail Handlers were confronted with a constructive fait
accompli, before any discussions could take place.

The Service

thereby created an apparent presumption that the change would be
made regardless of later possible discussions, thus rendering less
meaningful later discussions and its invitation for "input."

i FibreBoard Paper Products Corp. v. NLRB 379 U.S. 2003.

In short, whether a trial or experimental period, a change
was made on January 16, 2004, with an exclusive craft assignment
to the clerks.

And that was done without any discussions with the

Mail Handlers.
Significantly

I

find

nothing

in

the

thirty-day

notice

provision, nor has any contract or other applicable provision been
cited which permits the Service to implement a changed operation
during

the

thirty-day

experimental,

or

notice

otherwise.

period,
For

whether

whether

de

a

facto

trial

or

(trial

or

experimental) or de jure (permanent) the effect is the same.
has

been

shifted

from

a mixed

jurisdictional

operation

Work
to an

operation staffed by one craft.
Put simply, I believe that the thirty-day notice/discussion
requirement

was

period

time,

of

implementation

intended
and

two

days

to maintain
for

the

into

the

status

purposes

the

quo

stated,

thirty-day

for that
and

period

that
was

a

prejudicial breach of the status quo, and inconsistent with what
the parties intended by negotiating that status quo requirement.
As a remedy, I shall direct that the correct procedure be
followed.

Indeed, it may produce a resolution of this dispute, as

is one of the reasons for the thirty-day notice and discussions,
without further arbitration on the merits.
parties

to

engage

in

I direct the affected

discussions

about

this

operational change for 30 days, thereby satisfying and exhausting
their

respective

resolution

rights

and

obligations.

If

there

is

no

of this dispute it may be referred back to me for a

decision on Issue #2 above.

For that purpose and in that event I

shall retain my authority over this case.
Pending compliance with the foregoing ruling and its outcome,
the manual operation 121-48 as presently constituted may continue.

DATED:

November 12, 2004

Eric i7. Schmertz
Arbitrator
STATE OF NEW YORK

ss:
COUNTY OF NEW YORK
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who executed
this instrument, which is my AWARD.

RI-399 JURISDICTIONAL DISPUTE
ARBITRATION PANEL
-X

IN THE MATTER OF THE ARBITRATION
between
OPINION AND AWARD

UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE
-and-

Case#BOOM-lB-503091150

NATIONAL POSTAL MAIL HANDLERS UNION

Local #03027

-andAMERICAN POSTAL WORKERS UNION, AFL-CIO
-X

Before:

Eric J. Schmertz, Arbitrator

Appearances:

For the U.S. Postal Services
Francis E. McNamara
For the National Postal Mail Handlers Union
Robert J. Broxton
For the American Postal Workers Union:
Michael E. LaPoint

Place of Hearing:

Hampden, Maine

Date of Hearing:

November 10, 2004

AWARD

During the scheduled hearing on November 10, 2004, the
above-named parties settled the dispute involved.

At their

request I make their settlement my Consent Award as follows:
PRIORITY SOP
EQUIPMENT WITH ONLY PRIORITY
Handled on the platform by mailhandlers—
operation 210 A breakdown of shape sort and
Maine mail will be done. Maine mail will go
inside to clerks for finalization.
EQUIPMENT WITH MIXED CLASSES
Handled in 010 by mailhandlers.
In the 010 breakdown, one container will be
used for Priority.
The Priority container will go to the clerk
breakdown—operation 050, 055 for
finalization including SCF and outgoing
Priority by shape sort.
Joint Service talks will be given by management,
the APWU and the NPMHU to both Tours 3 and 1.
Any violations of this SOP that are grieved by
either Union will be addressed in the Article 15
process as a violation of Article 7.
This resolves all issues raised by the NPMHU and
the APWU regarding Priority mail breakdown in
case #BOOM-1B-J 03091150, Local #03027.
DATED:

November 22, 2004

Eric/J. Schmertz
Arbitrator

STATE OF NEW YORK
ss:
COUNTY OF NEW YORK

)

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who executed
this instrument, which is my AWARD.

RI-399 JURISDICTIONAL DISPUTE
ARBITRATION PANEL
-X

IN THE MATTER OF THE ARBITRATION
between
POST OFFICE
CASE NUMBER:
AOOM-1A-J04116249

UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE

-andRULING ON
ARBITRABILITY

AMERICAN POSTAL WORKERS UNION, AFL-CIO
-andNATIONAL POSTAL MAIL HANDLERS UNION
-X

Before:

ERIC J. SCHMERTZ, ARBITRATOR

Appearances:

For the U.S. Postal Services
James J. Kirk
For the APWA:
Michael E. LaPoint
For the NPMHU:
Lawrence Hill

Place of Hearing;

MidHudson P&DC, Newburg, New York

Date of Hearing:

July 28, 2004

AWARD
I find that the elimination of the Act Tag function related
the Outgoing Primary on Low Cost Tray Sorter was an operational
charge within the meaning of the last paragraph of RI-399 Dispute
Resolution MOU dated May 1, 1992 (Joint Exhibit #4 in the record).
As

such, Management

was

required

"to present

and discuss

such

change (s) with the Local Dispute Resolution Committee thirty (30)
days prior to the effective date of the operational charge"
find

that

Management.
the

that

presentment

and

discussion

was

Hence, the provision "within fourteen

effective

date

of

the

operational

change

not

done

I
by

(14) days from
the

adversely

impacted union may appeal the operational change to arbitration"
was

not

triggered,

because

condition precedent thereto.

the

thirty

(30) day

notice

was

a

Hence, the complaint to arbitration

of the Mail Handlers Union in dispute #AOOM-1AJ04116249 was not
untimely.
The argument of Management and the Postal Workers Union that
the dispute is barred from arbitration by Article II B. of Postal
Operations

1085-PO-204

is

unpersuasive.

That

Section

is

ambiguous.

It is not clear whether the "four (4) or more hours of

continuous work" applies to each individual employee assigned or
is cumulative to and among all the employees so assigned.

Here,

though individually, an assigned clerk may not work four or more
hours on Tour 3, it is acknowledged that three to five clerks are

so assigned

two hours each, making a total of from six to ten

hours.
With the well-settled presumption
that ambiguity

in favor of arbitration,

lacks sufficient precision to quantitatively bar

the dispute from arbitration.
Accordingly, the complaint of the Mail Handlers in dispute AOOM-1A-J04116249 is arbitrable.
The merits of that case will be heard at the next hearing
scheduled

for either September

17th or September

21, 2004 (the

parties are to advise which).

Eric/J. Schmertz
Arbitrator

DATED:

August 19, 2004

STATE OF NEW YORK

)

COUNTY:OF NEW YORK

)

ss :

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who executed
this instrument, which is my AWARD.

=11-399 REGIONAL ARBITRATION PROCEDURE
-X

IN THE MATTER OF THE ARBITRATION
between
NATIONAL POSTAL MAIL HANDLERS UNION

CONSENT AWARD

-andA98M-lA-£ 00245921
AMERICAN POSTAL WORKERS UNION
-and-

CLASS ACTION

QNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE
-X

The stipulated issue is:
Craft designation, AFSM 100 Operation 035.
Appearances:

For the NPMHU:
Mr. Lawrence Hill
For the APWU:
Mr. Michael E. LaPoint
For the U.S. Postal Services
Mr. Carmine V. Palladino

A hearing was scheduled for September 16, 2004, at the Mid
Island P&DC in Melville, New York.

Representatives of the above-

named parties appeared.
During the time of the scheduled hearing the parties directly
negotiated a settlement of that part of case A98M-1A-5002
referred to in the stipulated issue.

45921 as

At the request of all parties, I make that settlement my
ionsent Award, as follows:
The parties hereby mutually agree to delete
the language written in the letter, dated
August 11, 2000, authored by Henry Johnson,
Manager Inplant Support.
The language to be deleted is:
"During machine or console downtime, Mail
Processors assigned to the AFSM 100, may be
used in the prep area".
Furthermore, it is agreed that this language
is stricken and will not be placed into the
facility RI 399 Inventory.

DATED:

September 21, 2004

Eric/J. Schmertz
Arbi/trator
STATE OF NEW YORK

)

ss:
COUNTY OF NEW YORK
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who executed
this instrument, which is my AWARD.

OFFICE OF THE IMPARTIAL CHAIRMAN,
OCAL 100 TRANSPORT WORKERS UNION AND
NEW YORK BUS SERVICES
x

IN THE MATTER OF THE ARBITRATION
between
AWARD
LOCAL 100, TRANSPORT WORKERS UNION
OF AMERICA
-and-

NEW YORK BUS SERVICE

The
bargaining

Undersigned,

Impartial

Chairman

under

the collective

agreement between the above-named parties and having

duly heard the proofs and allegations of said parties regarding
the discharges of MICHAEL SANCHEZ and RODNEY PRIMUS at a hearing
on June 24, 2004, makes the following AWARD:
The discharges of MICHAEL S.A&CHEZ and RODNEY
PRIMUS are reduced to a disciplinary
suspension.
They shall be reinstated without back pay
effective June 20, 2004.
Said reinstatements are made with the
provision that neither will drive New York
City Board of Education work until they are
recertified by the New York City Board of
Education.
Mr. Primus' suspension by the New York City
Board of Education shall continue through
July 18, 2004.

Mr. Sanchez's suspension by the New York City
Board of Education will continue through July
26, 2004.
This AWARD is based on the particular facts
of these two cases, and shall not be
precedential.

Eric J/Schmertz
Impartial Chairman

DATED:

June 29, 2004

STATE OF NEW YORK

)
SS :

COUNTY OF NEW YORK

)

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Impartial Chairman that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

OFFICE OF THE IMPARTIAL CHAIRMAN,
LOCAL 100 TRANSPORT WORKERS UNION AND
NEW YORK BUS SERVICES

IN THE MATTER OF THE ARBITRATION
between
OPINION AND AWARD
LOCAL 100, TRANSPORT WORKERS UNION
OF AMERICA
-andNEW YORK BUS SERVICE
v

The stipulated issue is:
Was there just cause for the discharge of
BARRINGTON COPELAND? If not, what shall be
the remedy?
A

hearing

Copeland,

was

held

hereinafter

on

June

referred

9, 2004,
to

as

at

the

which

time

"grievant"

Mr.
and

representatives of the above-named Union and Employer appeared.
All concerned were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and
argument

and

to

examine

and

Arbitrator's Oath was waived.

cross-examine

record,

which

The

Post-hearing briefs were filed.

The grievant was discharged
driving

witnesses.

included

for an overall unsatisfactory
"multiple

accidents,

traffic

violations, and reckless driving."
The
documented

unsatisfactory

nature

of

his

record

as

a

driver

is

in the record by warnings, retraining efforts and a

five-day suspension in January 2004.

The latter suspension, also

included the admonition that if "violations continue, he would be
terminated."

That suspension and final warning was not challenged

or grieved by the grievant or the Union.
justification for the suspension

Hence the basis anc

and final warning

is no longer

challengeable.
Subsequent

thereto,

driving continued.

the

grievant's

erratic

and

dangerous

I accept as accurate the testimony of Joseph

A. Pereira a 19-A Examiner employed by GVC Ltd, that he saw the
grievant driving an Employer bus on March 17, 2004; that the bus
first stopped, and then backing up in traffic on the South-bound
lane

of

highway

1-95,

vehicles

to

evasive

others.

Manifestly this was a dangerous and prohibited driving

take

requiring
action

the
to

witness'

avoid

car

hitting

and
the

other
bus

or

maneuver by the grievant.
Also, the next day, on March 18, 2004, in a call and then a
letter

from

grievant

was

a member
seen

of the public,

driving

it was

erratically,

reported

changing

that the

lanes

without

signaling and moving at an excessively high speed on the Bruckner
Expressway.

Considering

the grievant's driving record, I have no

reason to disbelieve that report.
Accordingly, those two latter driving offenses, trigger the
discharge the grievant was expressly
driving continued unsatisfactorily.

warned

would

occur

if his

The Undersigned, duly designated as the Impartial Chairman
under the collective bargaining agreement between the above-named
parties, and having duly heard the proofs and allegations of said
parties, makes the following AWARD:
The discharge of BARRINGTON COPELAND was for
just cause.

Eric JVSchmertz
Impartial Chairman

DATED:

August 2, 2004

STATE OF NEW YORK

)

COUNTY OF NEW YORK

)

ss :

I, Eric J. Schmeitz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Impartial Chairman that •-! am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

IN THE MATTER OF THE ARBITRATION
between
OPINION AND AWARD
LOCAL 153 OPEIU

-andUNITE

The stipulated issue is:
Whether UNITE violated Article 4.3 of the
parties' collective bargaining agreement in
connection with the documentation it required
from laid-off employees in the month of January
2004 who wished to be eligible for severance?
If so, what shall be the remedy?
A hearing was held on September 15, 2004 at which time
representatives of Local 153 OPEIU ("Union") and UNITE
("Employer") appeared and were afforded full opportunity to
offer evidence and argument and to examine and cross-examine
witnesses.

The Arbitrator's Oath was waived.

Article 4.3, in pertinent part reads:
"...to be eligible for severance, an employee
must execute a General Release provided by the
Employer...."
It is the content of the General Release required and
executed by employees laid off in January 2004, that is in
dispute in this proceeding.

The Union argues that the General Release required of the
laid-off employees in this case, and entitled Memorandum of
Agreement and General Release, exceeded the traditional legal
substance of any such Release, and contained provisions that
were mandatory subjects of collective bargaining and hence
precluded from the Employer's unilateral inclusion.

But the

Union does not assert that the provisions of the Release are
violative of other specific provisions of the collective
bargaining agreement.
Article 4.3 was bilaterally bargained.

As such, it gave

authority to the Employer to "provide" the General Release.

I

interpreted that to mean that the substance of the Release was
also within the Employer's authority, provided that substance
was legitimately relevant to the job(s) in question, reasonable
in what is required, and not contrary to any lawful
prohibition.

I conclude, therefore, that subject to these

restrictions, the bilateral negotiation of Article 4.3
satisfied any mandatory bargaining aspects of the content of
the Release.
Union Exhibit #4 is the full content of the Release used
in January 2004, and is incorporated by reference herein.
I am not persuaded that the proper General Release is
confined to the General Release Form found in the General

Obligation Law, as the Union argues.

That Form is for

commercial transactions.
A Union-management relationship is sufficiently different
from a traditional commercial transaction to warrant and
justify an enlarged or substantively different Release,
especially as sanctioned by the unlimited language of Article
4.3 of the contract.

If the parties intended to use the

traditional business form, Article 4.3 could and should have so
provided.
Specifically the Union objects to paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, 6
and 9.
I find nothing wrong with paragraph 1.

It merely recites

the basis for the Release, namely the "lay-off" and the name of
the employee affected.
I find nothing wrong with paragraph 2.

It sets forth the

amount of severance pay and other benefits which the employee
is to receive.
I find nothing wrong with paragraph 3.

It sets forth the

extent of Health Insurance and COBRA election.
Paragraph 4 is not objectionable, provided it is
implemented reasonably and without imposing financial expense
or other undue burden on the employee.

If the Union contends

that its application is unreasonable, unduly burdensome to the

affected employee or imposes a financial expense to the
employee, those contentions are grievable and arbitrable under
the grievance and arbitration provisions of the contract.
Paragraph 6 is not objectionable if it relates to a job on
which the employee had access to confidential and/or sensitive
information.

Under that fact and circumstance/ it is a

customary and therefore proper restriction.

Again, if the

Employer attempts to apply it to an employee who did not have a
job with access to such information, the Union's objection
would be grievable and arbitrable.
Paragraph 9 is not objectionable.

It is a traditional

consideration (i.e. a waiver of future employment with this
Employer) for the severance pay and other stipulated benefits.
However, I do find one objection that is a matter of form,
rather than substance.
a General Release.

Article 4.3, specifically provides for

It does not authorize a document titled

"Memorandum of Agreement and General Release."

Accordingly,

though I have found the content of Union Exhibit #4 to be
proper quid pro quos for termination of employment and payment
of severance pay and other benefits, I find that the document
used should have been entitled General Release.

Therefore, I direct a modification by deleting from the
title, preamble and body of the document all references to a
Memorandum of Agreement.

i
In short, subject to relevant and reasonable application,
to the grievability and arbitrability as stated above, and to
the foregoing modification the text of Union Exhibit #4 is
proper and upheld.
Finally, if there be an ambiguity in the meaning of
"General Release" in Article 4.3, resolution is found in past
practice.

The evidence discloses that for prior lay offs, the

text of the General Releases used at those times was virtually
the same as the instant Union Exhibit #4, with variations, if
any, reasonably related to the job, duties and status of the
employee(s) laid off.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above-named
parties, makes the following AWARD:
Based on the "modification" directed, the
grievable/arbitrable

references and reason-

ableness of implementation as stated in the
foregoing Opinion, UNITE did not violate
Article 4.3 of the contract by the documen-

tation it required of employees laid off in
the month of January 2004.

Eric J. -Schmertz, Arbitrator

/

DATED:

September 29, 2004

STATE OF NEW YORK

)
ss:

COUNTY OF NEW YORK

)

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who executed
this instrument, which is my AWARD.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION,
ADMINISTRATOR
-X

IN THE MATTER OF THE ARBITRATION
between
OPINION AND AWARD
NEW YORK STATE NURSES ASSOCIATION
Case No.
13 300 0184803

-andWESTCHESTER COUNTY HEALTH CARE
CORPORATION
-X

The stipulated issue is:
Was there just cause for the 30-day suspensions of
CHRISTOPHER WILLIAMS and STUART HIRSH?

If not, what

shall be the remedy?
A
Messrs.

hearing

Williams

"grievants")
(hereinafter
County

was

and

held

and

on

February

Hirsh

to as the

Healthcare Corporation

"Employer"),
opportunity

(hereinafter

representatives

referred

appeared.

All

24,

of

2004

referred

the

Nurses

"Union")

and

to

as

the

Association

the Westchester

(hereinafter referred to as the
concerned

were

to offer evidence and argument

cross-examine witnesses.

at which time

afforded

full

and to examine and

The Arbitrator's Oath was waived; the

Union and Employer filed post-hearing briefs.
The grievants are charged with and were suspended 30 days
each for what the Employer characterizes as "insubordination."

The grievants

are employed

as Star Flight Nurses

on the

Employer's helicopters, providing emergency medical treatment and
transporting patients by air to the Westchester Medical Center in
the Westchester and Ulster County geographical area.

They are

based, with a helicopter, at the Ulster County Air Base or at the
Westchester Medical Center Base.
on

operational

requirements,

It is undisputed that depending
weather,

aircraft

problems

and

staffing, their Base may be changed from time to time from one of
those locations to the other.
The

Employer

asserts

that

on

February

11,

2003

after

reporting to the Ulster County Base they were advised of a site
change and directed to report to the Westchester Medical Center
Base.

And that they repeatedly refused to do so.
Based on the entire record before me I am persuaded

that

the grievants delayed too long in responding to the site change
directive, and understood
subject

that by doing so that they would be

to disciplinary action.

However, I find that

certain

unique circumstances were present at the time which legitimately
account for some of the grievants' delay and which to an extent,
but not
while

fully, mitigates part of the penalty

generally

an

insubordinate

legitimate work order
change

order

was

refusal

to

imposed.
comply

Also,
with

a

(and there is no doubt here that the site

operationally

legitimate)

warrants

serve

discipline,
offending

including

summary

employee's

prior

dismissal

record.

regardless

But

here

I

of

the

find

a

contractural limitation on the magnitude of the penalty imposed.
The unique circumstances are viewed against the backdrop of
the facts of the charges.
I

have

no

reason

to disbelieve the

Flight Nurse Anne Wargo.

testimony

of Chief

She explained the operational needs for

the site change; testified that she spoke to or made adequate
communications with both grievants; and instructed them to change
their locations from Ulster to Westchester.
not

only

answered

did

grievants

refuse

to

comply,

but

directly

"yes" when she asked them pointedly whether "they were

refusing."
change

the

She testified that

She testified that she continued to direct them to

their

Base

despite

their

request

that

an

alternative

arrangement be made, and despite their questions regarding the
use of their own cars to change locations.
her

testimony

that

she

rejected

any

I accept as accurate
such

alternatives

or

questions and I also accept her testimony that she did not offer
or grant the grievants' "sick time" (which would allow them to
avoid the new assignment) .

Credibly

and consistent

with the

universally well-settled rule that an employee must comply with a
work order and grieve later, I accept her testimony that she told
the grievants

that she would

not

"negotiate" with them, but

directed them to comply.

Finally, while it is generally required

that an employee who refuses to comply with a work order be
expressly

warned

that

failure

to

do

so

would

result

in

disciplinary action, I am satisfied that when Ms. Wargo told the
grievants that their refusals would be reported to the Deputy
Director of Nursing, that was clear notice to the grievants that
their conduct would be reviewed for disciplinary penalties.
What was unique?

It is that this was a "first impression"

for the grievants and also for Wargo.

Though the Base had been

changed before, it was always before the grievants reported for
duty at a Base originally assigned.

Here, unlike prior site

changes,

to

they

instructed

had

properly

to report

reported

to Westchester.

Ulster

before

Factually

being

I find that

though the Employer tried to notify them earlier, the efforts to
do so failed.
Neither grievant was reached directly and if messages were
left on answering machines <~>r cell phones, I accept as accurate
the grievants' testimony that they did not get them before they
reported to Ulster.

So, confronted for the first time with a

Base change after reporting for duty, I am not surprised nor do I
fault

their

arrangement

initial

efforts

to

work

out

(like relocation of the aircraft).

an

alternative

Similarly, if

they raised the possibility of taking "sick time," because it

appears that there may have been some such prior practice for
that.

And while it is unclear to me when the question of use of

their own cars and mileage reimbursement came up, I would not
find that fatal if part of the initial discussions.
grievants

pressed

those

points

too

long

and

But the

frankly,

too

defiantly once Margo rejected them and repeatedly ordered them to
Westchester.

At

the

point

that

she

said

she

would

"not

negotiate" the site change, the grievants should have known that
their responsibility was to comply forthwith leaving to a later
grievance any challenge to the propriety of the site change or
the conditions of traveling form Ulster to Westchester and even
any entitlement to "sick time."

From that point forward, though

they may have thought they had some rights to continue to resist,
based I think on their prior unblemished records and apparent
dedication to their medical duties, they were wrong and hence
technically

insubordinate

and subject to disciplinary action.

That one or both were ultimately prepared to go to Westchester,
after they were told to go home and that the matter would be so
referred to the Deputy Director of Nursing was immaterial, it was
then too late.

That later conclusion is not changed in my mind

by the hearsay and ambiguous E-mail from "Bobby" that purports to
send a message to the grievants from Margo stating "...she thanks
you but you can go home."

The final question is whether a 30-day suspension under the
facts and unique circumstances of this case is appropriate or
excessive.

Normally,

because

insubordination

is

a

serious

offense, an Arbitrator should not substitute his judgment for
that of the employer on the magnitude of the penalty imposed.
Here, however,
procedures

the Employer has promulgated certain rules and

regarding

the

offense

of

insubordination

which

constrain the measure of penalty by requiring consideration of
certain factors in determining the appropriate penalty.
promulgated

those

factors

in

its Human

Resources

Having

Policy and

Procedure, the Employer is so bound and constrained.

Section

111-D H V, Section 5 of said Policy and Procedures, the subject
of which is:
"Employee Behavior
Employee Discipline"
reads inter alia:
"Insubordination
includes...a
obey management directives."

refusal

to

"...With regard to a refusal to obey a
directive the following factors must be
considered (emphasis on "must" added).
A)

What is the magnitude of the offense and has
the employee engaged in similar behavior in
the past.

B)

Was the order or directive clearly expressed
by the management official.

C)

Has the discipline been applied in a nondiscriminatory
and
progressive
manner.
(emphasis added)

D)

Was the employee made aware that his or her
refusal to carry out the directive would
result in disciplinary action.

E)

Is it self-evident that the employee's
refusal to carry out a directive constitutes
insubordination and, therefore no warning is
necessary.

It is reasonable to conclude that the phrase "the following
factors must be considered" means that all the factors must be
satisfied to justify severe discipline.
A)

Above, has not been fully satisfied. Though
the offense was of sufficient magnitude, the
grievants had not engaged in similar behavior
in the past.
And fortunately, no patients
were endangered.

B)

Above, was adequately satisfied.

C)

Above, has been partially satisfied and
partially not satisfied albeit ambiguously.
The discipline was applied nondiscriminatorily, but not progressively.
"Progressive discipline" as defined by the
Policy is:
a. Oral warning(s)
b. Written warning(s)
c. Formal Discipline

The Policy goes on to provide for "formal discipline" (i.e.
suspension

and/or

discharge)

for

such

misconduct

as

"theft,

immediate threat to the safety of himself/herself or others etc.
And while it is not totally so limited, application of the legal
principle of ejustum generis, makes formal discipline applicable

to

offenses

that

constitute

crimes,

moral

turpitude

and

endangerment.
I

do not

think

the grievants'

misconduct

in this case

equates to those type of offenses.
D)

Above
was
satisfied
by
notifying
grievants
that
their
conduct
would
reported to the Deputy Director.

E)

Above was satisfied by compliance with D.

the
be

This is not to say that the Employer was required in this
case

to

discipline

writing.

the

grievants

by

a warning,

oral

or in

Rather it is to say that under the definitions and

conditions

of

the

Policy

as applied to

insubordination,

and

particularly because all of the factors that "must" be considered
were not

fully satisfied,

a rule

of reason,

calling

for an

equitable remedy, should be applied to this case.
On balance, considering all the foregoing and based on the
facts of this case alone, I am convinced
"overstepped the bounds"

that the grievants

in response to a legitimate directive

and that discipline is justified.

But, clearly though a simple

warning is not enough, a 30-day suspension under the factors of
Section 5 (Insubordination) is excessive.
A

suspension

of

10

working

days

equitable and appropriate in this case.

is

both

reasonable,

The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator, and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above-named
parties, makes the following AWARD:
The 30-day suspensions of CHRISTOPHER WILLIAMS and
STUART HIRSH are reduced to disciplinary
suspensions for each of 10 working days.

They

shall be made whole for the difference.

Eric i/. Schmertz, Arbitrator

DATED:

April 20, 2004

STATE OF NEW YORK

)

COUNTY OF NEW YORK

)

ss :

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who executed
this instrument, which is my AWARD.

OFFICE OF THE IMPARTIAL CHAIRMAN
-X

IN THE MATTER OF THE ARBITRATION

between
OPINION AND AWARD
LOCAL 100, TRANSPORT WORKERS UNION
OF AMERICA
-and-

WHITE PLAINS BUS CO, INC.
-X

In accordance with the Expedited Submission Agreement dated
February

28, 2003 between

the above-named

Union

and

Employer,

which is a mutually agreed to forum for arbitration of discharges
of

school

bus

drivers

and monitors

charged

with

"having been

responsible for unattended children," said parties have submitted
to me

the questions

of whether

there was

just

cause

for the

discharges of drivers Percy Henry and Monet Oglesbee.
By agreement of the parties and in accordance with said
Expedited Submission Agreement, the issues were presented to me by
written documents without a formal evidentiary hearing.
I find that the facts are that Percy Henry failed to pick up
five children assigned to his bus at the end of the school day on
January 7, 2004, leaving them unattended at school.

He realized

this at a drop-off stop and apparently only after inquiry from a
parent awaiting his child there.

Henry then returned to trie

school to retrieve the children left.

It appears that during the

time they were left, they were unattended.

Oglesbee left a child on his van when and after he returned
to the yard/ apparently not checking the van ' as required, at the
end of the run.

The child was discovered on the van by a

supervisor.
The facts of these two incidents fit squarely within the
express prohibitions of the Employer's published Memorandum, of
February 1, 1997 and are violative of the Employer's promulgated
rules requiring •&•• procedure to ensure tha't children are not left
unattended when they should be in the Employer's care4

That

rule and the procedures to be followed to insure compliance have
been upheld uniformly as reasonable and relevant to the job duties
of a driver by several prior arbitration Awards.

Similarly, the

penalty of discharge for that c* those offenses has been also
upheld as proper and for just cause.
I find nothing in the instant cases that distinguish . . them
from the several Awards the Impartial Chairman has rendered for
those offenses (See Matter of Frank Benedetto June 25f, 1997;
Matter of Etta Daniels, July 1, 1999 and Matter of Patsy DeSanto,
April 2, 2003).
The grievants' explanations in the instant case are not
excusable defenses.

Accordingly, the discharges of Percy Henry and Monet Oglesbee
were for just cause and are upheld.
As in the earlier, aforesaid cited cases, I see sufficient
similarities to make a similar recommendation herein../
Therefore, without prejudice to the validity and continued
enforceability of the Employer's rule, without any precedent for
any future matters, and solely for the Employer to consider in its
sole discretion and because of the grievants' apparent
satisfactory prior record, I recommend the following:.
That the grievants be re-employed -without back 'pay.-to, .avai^abljs 'w.o.r.k on, ,:
.a different, route and for a different school district from those. ..they were

r "

.

"

. . ...... . " ' " ' "

working at the time of the'incidents.

The

Undersigned,

Impartial

Chairman

under

the

collective

bargaining agreement between the above-named parties, and having
duly

considered

the

submitted

proofs and

allegations

of

parties, makes the following AWARD:
The discharges of Percy Henry
Oglesbee were for just cause.

and Monet

Eric J/ Schmertz
Impartial Chairman

said

DATED:

February 9, 2004

STATE OF NEW YORK

)
ss:

!OUNTY OF NEW YORK

)

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Impartial Chairman that I am the individual described in and who
xecuted this instrument, which is my AWARD.

OFFICE OF THE IMPARTIAL CHAIRMAN
-X
IN THE MATTER OF THE ARBITRATION
between
OPINION AND AWARD
LOCAL 100, TRANSPORT WORKERS UNION
OF AMERICA
-andWHITE PLAINS BUS CO. INC.
-X

In accordance with the Expedited Submission Agreement dated
February

28,

2003 between

the above-named Union and Employer,

which is a mutually agreed to forum for arbitration of discharges
of

school bus

drivers

and monitors

charged with

"having been

responsible for unattended children," said parties have submitted
to me

the questions

of whether there was

just

cause

for the

discharges of drivers Percy Henry and Monet Oglesbee.
By agreement of the parties and in accordance with said
Expedited Submission Agreement, the issues were presented to me by
written documents without a formal evidentiary hearing.
I find that the facts are that Percy Henry failed to pick up
five children assigned to his bus at the end of the school day on
January 7, 2004, leaving them unattended at school.

He realized

this at a drop-off stop and apparently only after inquiry from a
parent awaiting his child there.

Henry then returned to the

school to retrieve the children left.

It appears that during the

time they were left, they were unattended.

Oglesbee left a child on his van when and after he returned
to the yard, apparently not checking the van
end of the run.

as required, at the

The child was discovered on the van by a

supervisor.
The facts of these two incidents fit squarely within the
express prohibitions of the Employer's published Memorandum of
February 1, 1997 and are violative of the Employer's promulgated
rules requiring -a

procedure to ensure that children are not left

unattended when they should be in the Employer's care.

That

rule and the procedures to be followed to insure compliance have
been upheld uniformly as reasonable and relevant to the job duties
of a driver by several prior arbitration Awards.

Similarly, the

penalty of discharge for that of those offenses has been also
upheld as proper and for just cause.
I find nothing in the instant cases that distinguish . them
from the several Awards the Impartial Chairman has rendered for
those offenses (See Matter of Frank Benedetto June 2b,_

1997;

Matter of Etta Daniels, July 1, 1999 and Matter of Patsy DeSanto,
April 2, 2003).
The grievants' explanations in the instant case are not
excusable defenses.

Accordingly, the discharges of Percy Henry and Monet Oglesbee
were for just cause and are upheld.
As in the earlier, aforesaid cited cases, I see sufficient
similarities to make a similar recommendation herein.
Therefore, without prejudice to the validity and continued
enforceability of the Employer's rule, without any precedent for
any future matters, and solely for the Employer to consider in its
sole discretion and because of the grievants' apparent
satisfactory prior record, I recommend the following:
That the grievants be re-employed without ba,ck pay to ava,ila,bre work on
-a different route and for a different school district from those .they were
I
' " . . . . .
working at the time of the incidents.

The

Undersigned,

Impartial

Chairman

under

the

collective

bargaining agreement between the above-named parties, and having
duly

considered

the

submitted

proofs and

allegations

of

parties, makes the following AWARD:
The discharges of Percy Henry
Oglesbee were for just cause.

and Monet

Eric J. Schmertz
Impartial Chairman

said

DATED:

February 9, 2004

STATE OF NEW YORK

)
ss:

COUNTY OF NEW YORK

)

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Impartial Chairman that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

IMPARTIAL CHAIRMAN, LOCAL 100 TRANSPORT
WORKERS UNION AND WHITE PLAINS BUS CO. INC.
x

IN THE MATTER OF THE ARBITRATION
between
OPINION AND AWARD
LOCAL 100, TRANSPORT WORKERS UNION
OF AMERICA

-andWHITE PLAINS BUS CO. INC.
-X

The stipulated issue is:
Was there just
DONOVAN HALL.
remedy?

cause for the discharge of
If not, what shall be the

A hearing was held on February 20, 2004, at which time Mr.
Hall,

hereinafter

referred

to

as

representatives of the above-named

Union

the

"grievant"

and

and Employer appeared.

All concerned were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and
argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.
The Employer cites and relies on my Decision in the Matter of
Maria Ciapetta (December 8, 1998).
The facts in the instant case are distinguishable from that
matter.
cumulative

That

case

record

dealt

of

with

accidents

propensity or accident proneness
driving errors, with attendant
Employer liability.

a

series

which

I

of
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I ruled that for that reason the Employer

need not tolerate that future prospect and therefore had the right
to severe said employee from its employ.
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This is not to say that a severe first accident may not be

grounds for summary dismissal.

Rather it is to say, in this

particular case, that the unique circumstances

that caused the

accident lead me to conclude that it was aberrant and not yet
evidence of propensity or accident proneness or of chronic driving
deficiencies.

I believe that though preventable and chargeable

because of the grievant's negligence, it does not represent what
his future driving record would be.

Specifically I do not think

he would have such an accident again.
Simply put, he placed an unopened beverage can precariously
on top of his personal belongings bag in the console next to the
driver's seat.

As he made a left turn on to Mamaroneck Avenue the

can fell to the floor and apparently lodged itself under the brake
and accelerator pedal.

He then, negligently, took his eyes off

the road while attempting to dislodge the can with his feet or by
bending down.

The bus continued to veer left, crossed from the

driving lane into the left lane and struck and rode on top of a
Mercedes in the left on coming lane, and pushed the Mercedes

backward into a Ford passenger car.

The Mercedes was totaled, its

driver injured and the Ford damaged.

But for the unsafe location

of the can and his negligence in taking his eyes off the road in
attempting to retrieve it or dislodge it, the accident would not
have occurred.

These most particular events, albeit very serious

and negligently based, lead me to believe that the accident was a
one-time event.
This hopeful conclusion is buttressed by the grievant's good
prior record.
prior problems.
him

a trainer

In the one year of his employment he has had no
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I believe

that but

for this

unfortunate accident, and the unique circumstances that caused it,
the grievant was on his way to a good employment record with the
Employer.

Indeed,

no

less a person

that the Employer's CEO,

characterized his record prior to the accident as "exemplary," I
believe that given another chance, the grievant will not commit
accidents and will develop into a valued if not superior employee.
I reiterate and affirm all the principles I set forth in the
Ciapetta case and other decisions of mine spelling out the special
fiduciary duties of the Employer and its drivers.

But in this

case, under its particular facts and circumstances, and on a "last
chance" basis, I will give the grievant the opportunity to redeem
himself and show a resumption of his otherwise "exemplary" status.
The Undersigned, Impartial Chairman under the collective
bargaining agreement between the above-named parties, and having
duly heard the proofs and allegations of said parties, makes the
following AWARD:
The discharge of DONOVAN HALL is reduced to a
disciplinary
suspension.
He
shall be
reinstated without back pay on a "last
chance" basis.
He shall be required to
undertake
any
additional
training
the
Employer deems necessary. The period between
his discharge and his reinstatement shall be
deemed a disciplinary suspension for the
accident of November 10, 2003.

Eric J. Schmertz
Impartial Chairman

DATED:

March 5, 2004

STATE OF NEW YORK

)
ss:

COUNTY OF NEW YORK

)

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Impartial Chairman that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.
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A hearing was held on February 20, 2004, at which time Mr.
Hall,
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representatives of the above-named Union and Employer

and

appeared.

All concerned were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and
argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.
The Employer cites and relies on my Decision in the Matter of
Maria Ciapetta (December 8, 1998).
The facts in the instant case are distinguishable from that
matter.
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